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COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE AND MOTION PICTURES*

Peter Jaszi**
I. MOTION PICTURES AND COPYRIGHT DISCIPLINE

Consider the following passage, drawn from what appears to have been the
first published report of a copyright infringement involving the new art of motion
pictures in the United States:
The complainant's operator, by means of a pivoted camera of special
construction, designed and owned by complainant, took in rapid
succession, on a single highly sensitized celluloid film 300 feet long,
4,500 pictures, each of which was a shade different from its predecessor
and successor, and all of which collectively represented at different
points Kaiser Wilhelm's yacht Meteor while being christened and
launched. From this film or negative a positive reproduction was made
on a celluloid sheet by light exposure. The value of such celluloid
reproduction is that by means of an appliance similar to a magic lantern
these views may be thrown on a screen in rapid succession so as to give
the effect of actual motion, and pictorically reproduce launching
precisely as it took place. This positive celluloid sheet was sent by the
complainant to the Department of the Interior, and by it copyrighted to
him as proprietor under "the title of a photograph, the title to which is in
the following words, to wit, 'Christening and Launching Kaiser
Wilhelm's Yacht Meteor."' The complainant thereafter placed on the
copies thereof issued by him a notice of copyright inscribed on a
celluloid plate fastened on the front and at one end of the sheet. From the
other end of one of such marked articles about one-third thereof was
detached by some unknown person, and came into the hands of
respondent, without knowledge on his part of its having been
copyrighted. The 1,500 pictures on this part, which represented a part of
the launch, Lubin photographed on a sensitized celluloid film. From this
negative he reproduced a positive on a celluloid sheet, which was, of
course, an exact reproduction of the copyrighted one of the complainant.
These were sold to exhibitors, and enabled them to reproduce the part of
the launch therein represented.'

* An earlier version of this essay appeared in the OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FILM AND
STUDIES (Robert Kolker ed. 2007).
** Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University (Director,
Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Law Clinic; Co-Director, Program on
Information Justice and Intellectual Property).
'Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 240-41 (3d Cir. 1903).
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The decision helped to establish, among other things, that motion pictures
were entitled to the protection of the law even though they had not been in
contemplation when the Copyright Act of 1870 was enacted. The court reasoned
that
[f]rom the standpoint of preparatory work in securing the negative, the
latter consists of a number of different views, but when the negative was
secured the article reproduced therefrom was a single photograph of the
whole. And that it is, in substance, a single photograph, is shown by the
fact that its value consists in its protection as a whole or unit, and the
injury to copyright protection 3consists not in pirating one picture, but in
appropriating it in its entirety.
The Edison court also demonstrated another kind of truth about motion
pictures: that from its inception the new medium was a radically appropriative
one. 4 Whether or not one believes the self-serving and ultimately unavailing
representation of the defendant, Sigmund "Pop" Lubin, that he was unaware of the
Edison copyright is not the point:5 then, as now, the movies thrived on their ability
to capture and repurpose existing material, much of it subject to prior claims of
copyright protection.
Other early encounters between film and copyright dealt with less
straightforward appropriations from one production to another, like the motion
picture involved in American Mutoscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Manufacturing
Co.
An examination of the complainant's positive film ... shows that it
contains several hundred pictures, and that the camera in which were
produced the negatives from which the positive film was printed
occupied no less than seven or eight different positions, the first two or
three of which, it is clear from the statements of the bill of complaint,
were at or near to Gen. Grant's Tomb in New York City, the others being
evidently in some country district. The defendant's photograph is also a
positive film, evidently printed from negatives taken by a camera located
Id. at 242 (stating that the motion picture at issue met the statutory requirement even
though "the continuous method by which [the] negative was secured was unknown when
the act was passed").
2

3 Id.

4Id. at 241.
5Id. For a first-hand account of Lubin's questionable duping practices, see FRED J.
BALSHOFER & ARTHUR C. MILLER, ONE REEL A WEEK 7-8 (1967). Balshofer also notes

that "[blesides duping and occasionally making a picture, [the Philadelphia studio] faked
championship bouts by using matched doubles for the boxers and staging the round-byround action from the newspaper accounts," and describes the production of an ersatz
newsreel of the San Francisco earthquake using cardboard cutouts of buildings. Id. at 9.
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at seven or eight different places, the first two or three of which were
taken near to Gen. Grant's Tomb, or to a structure strongly resembling it;
the remaining places being also in some country district. That the
complainant's photograph is a reproduction upon a positive film of
pictures on negatives taken by a camera located at different points is
confirmed by the language of the ninth paragraph of the bill, which states
that "the scene prominently depicted in said photograph occurred largely
at Grant's Tomb, on Riverside Drive, in New York City," and in the
subsequent statement in the same paragraph that "in successive scenes
the chase is depicted across the country in various situations." The title
of the complainant's copyrighted photograph consists simply of the word
"Personal." There is nothing in the proceedings for securing the
copyright, as they are set forth in the bill, indicating that the scene
depicted in the photograph "represents a French gentleman," or any other
person who had "inserted an advertisement stating his desire to meet a
handsome girl at Grant's Tomb." Consequently, there is nothing in the
complainant's photograph, or in the title to its copyright, or in the
proceedings for securing its copyright, in any wise suggestive of the title
of the defendant's photograph, which is "How a French Nobleman
Got a
6
Wife Through the New York Herald Personal Columns."
Although the court was not convinced that the latter film was an unlawful
derivative of the former, its opinion established the principle that infringement by
wrongful adaptation, rather than from direct reproduction, is possible under the
copyright law as applied to motion pictures. 7 The United States Supreme Court
underlined and extended this principle six years later, when, in the "Ben-Hur"
decision, it concluded that the unauthorized production of a motion picture version
could infringe the copyright of the underlying literary work. 8
Indeed, down to the present day much of the copyright litigation surrounding
motion pictures has grown out of controversies about the wrongful appropriation
of content or imagery from one motion picture to another, or from a creative work
in another medium into the motion pictures. 9 This essay, however, is concerned
with the legal implications of another set of practices characteristic of motion
picture production, to which one might apply the term coined by Bernard Edelman
in a somewhat different context: the "over-appropriation of the real." 10 While
much of the focus in what follows is on documentary filmmaking, I hope to
indicate how the problems of copyright arise, and how the doctrine of fair use can
help to resolve them, across a spectrum of media.
6

137 F. 262, 264-65 (C.C.D.N.J. 1905).

7 Id. at 267-68.
8 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62 (1911).
9 See Peter Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying
Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REv. 715 (1981).

10

BERNARD EDELMAN,

OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE: ELEMENTS FOR A MARXIST

THEORY OF LAW 38-43 (Elizabeth Kingdom trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979) (1973).
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Motion pictures' dependence on the raw material of reality is, of course, most
obvious in connection with the documentary film tradition, 1" which has its origins
in early newsreels and "local views."' 12 But well before 1917, it also had become an
important part of the classical mode of American fiction film production, with its
emphasis on placing the spectator within an illusionistic three-dimensional space.
Not only did actual locations come to be substituted more commonly for studio
backgrounds, but as the authors of The Classical Hollywood Cinema note,
"whenever possible sets were built on location, so that real landscapes rather than
painted flats frequently appeared outside windows in the early teens. 13 Inevitably,
however, the increasing reliance of motion picture production on the appropriation
of reality has given rise to tensions that have been expressed in terms of conflicts
over copyright. These tensions have become more acute over time, as the "real"
environment has become more and more saturated with media artifacts, and as
copyright law itself has extended its domain over more and more of those media
objects.' 4
Within copyright law, the tension between contemporary creators' needs for
access to preexisting material, on the one hand, and the imperatives of copyright
ownership, on the other, are mediated primarily by the so-called "fair use"
doctrine. The application of this venerable legal concept, which exempts some
substantial takings of protected content from infringement liability, is the subject
of this essay.
II. WHAT IS FAIR USE?
"Fair use" has its origins in a line of judicial decisions dating back to 1841,
when a federal court considered whether a biographer of George Washington
should be excused for having borrowed material from an earlier published
biography. 15 The fair use doctrine functions as a kind of "safety valve" in the
copyright system. As the reach of copyright law increased in the mid-twentieth
century, it came to be more frequently relied upon by defendants and interpreted
by the judges. There have been various efforts to explain the theoretical bases of
fair use, but perhaps none better than Alan Latman's 1958 summary, which was
based on a comprehensive review of cases and other authorities:

11 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, DOCUMENTARY FILM-A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION

(forthcoming
Oct. 2007).
12

CHARLES MUSSER, THE EMERGENCE OF CINEMA: THE AMERICAN SCREEN TO

1907,

at 266 (1990).

13 DAVID BORDWELL, JANET STAIGER, & KRISTIN THOMPSON,

THE CLASSICAL

1960, at 217 (1985).
In documentary practice, the tension has been further exacerbated by the rise of the
cinema veriti style, reliance on which increases the likelihood that copyrighted works will
be captured incidentally in the course of filming, and by the increasing inclination of some
filmmakers to tape the media environment itself as a subject.
15 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D.Mass 1841) (No. 4901).
HOLLYWOOD CINEMA: FILM STYLE & MODE OF PRODUCTION TO
14
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[A]s a condition of obtaining the statutory grant, the author is deemed to
consent to certain reasonable uses of his copyright work to promote the
ends of public welfare for which he was granted copyright ....
The theory of "enforced consent" suggests another rationale which
relies more directly upon the constitutional purpose of copyright. It has
often been stated that a certain degree of latitude for the users of
copyrighted works is indispensable for the "Progress of Science and
useful Arts" [because] progress depends on a certain amount of
borrowing, quotation and comment.
Justification for a reasonable use of a copyrighted work is also said
to be based on custom. This would appear to be closely related to the
theory of implied consent. It also reflects the relevance of custom to what
has been stated that fair use is such as is
is reasonable. In any event, ' it
"reasonable and customary. 16
More recently, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that fair use
is one of the mechanisms by which copyright recognizes the principle of freedom
of expression that is enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
as applied to
without fair use, copyright law could be found unconstitutional
17
filmmaking.
documentary
as
such
activities
expressive
The judge-made fair use doctrine was codified in 1976, as part of the general
revision of the Copyright Act of 1909, which took effect on January 1, 1978.18
Both before that time and afterwards, the doctrine has been extensively interpreted
by the U.S. federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court and the various
circuit courts of appeals. Among other things, these courts have made it clear that,
broadly speaking, fair use comes in two varieties-one relating to personal or
material and the other to reuses that are arguably
private end uses of copyrighted
"productive" in nature.1 9 Obviously, the dichotomy is a somewhat artificial one,
since all creative practice ultimately is rooted in imitation. But the distinction is
serviceable nevertheless, if only because it allows us to note that some aspects of
the fair use doctrine are fairing better in contemporary courts than others. Recent
commentaries on case law suggest that the concept of "passive" fair use is at risk

16

ALAN LATMAN,

STUDY No.

14,

FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS

(1958),

STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781, 785 (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
18 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
19See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994)

reprintedin 2
17

(highlighting the importance of permitting reuses that are transformative); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984) (addressing the degree
to which the fair use doctrine should protect "productive" uses). For a discussion of the
difficulty of articulating a workable definition of transformative use, see, for example,
Mitch Tuchman, Judge Leval's Transformation Standard: Can it Really Distinguish Foul
from Fair?,51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y. 101 (2003).

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. 3

today, as new technologies continue to blur the public/private line. a° By contrast,
the "active" branch of the doctrine is thriving, in its application to fields of cultural
practice as diverse as scholarship, musical parody, computer programming, and
film production.21

JI-.FAIR USE IN ACTION
Section 107 directs courts considering whether a particular challenged use is
fair to evaluate, among other things, four factors derived from pre-1976 judicial
opinions:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3)

the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.22

In recent decisions, moreover, the courts have indicated that a critical
consideration in evaluating most, if not all, of these factors, is whether the use can
be considered "transformative"-whether it "adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character." 23 If that is the case, the first factor can weigh in
favor of fair use even if the use is "commercial" in character. 24 Self-evidently, the
second factor tends to favor transformative uses as well, precisely because they
add value to the preexisting material rather than merely repeating it for its original
purpose. Moreover, if the use is transformative, courts will approve the use of a
greater proportion of the protected material in connection with the third factor.
Finally, and crucially, if a use is a transformative one, it is likely to satisfy the
fourth factor as well, because, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently
recognized, copyright owners are not entitled to control the "transformative
markets" for their works.2
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained how fair use works today in
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.26 In that case, the defendant
20

Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How the Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free

Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537 (2004).
21 Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A.
133, 137-38 (2003).
22 17 U.S.C. § 107.
23
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 579.
24 Id. ("[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism .. ").
25 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15
(2d Cir.
2006).
26 id.
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published what the court described as a "480-page coffee table book [that] tells the
story of the Grateful Dead along a timeline running continuously through the book,
chronologically combining over 2000 images representing dates in the Grateful
Dead's history with explanatory text. A typical page of the book features a collage
of images, text, and graphic art designed to simultaneously capture the eye and
inform the reader. ' 27 The plaintiff owned the copyrights to posters and other
graphic materials associated with the musical group's historic appearances at the
Fillmore Auditorium and other Bay Area venues. 28 After license negotiations for
the use of these materials in the book broke down, the publisher proceeded to use
seven of them without authorization, and the lawsuit followed.29
The court's analysis began with the first statutory factor: the purpose and
character of use." Because the publisher deployed the images in a "transformative"
way, the judges agreed with the trial court that the
use of images placed in chronological order on a timeline is
transformatively different from the mere expressive use of images on
concert posters or tickets. Because the works are displayed to
commemorate historic events, arranged in a creative fashion, and
displayed in significantly reduced form, . . . the first fair use factor

weighs heavily in favor of DK.3 °
In other words, the recontextualization of the quoted material made all the
difference to the determination of its transformative character. Moreover, if the
user's purpose was transformative, the mere fact that it was also commercial does
not bar application of
the doctrine. 3' In fact, the court notes, most fair uses are
32
profit.
for
conducted
The second factor, the nature of the copyright work, which often favors
copyright plaintiffs, was judged here to be inconclusive, on reasoning that echoes
the language already quoted:
We recognize ...that the second factor may be of limited usefulness
where the creative work of art is being used for a transformative
purpose ... of enhancing the biographical

information

provided in

Illustrated Trip. Accordingly, we hold that even though BGA's images
are creative works, which are a core concern of copyright protection, the
second factor has limited weight in our analysis because the purpose of
DK's 33use was to emphasize the images' historical rather than creative
value.

Id. at 607.
Id. at 607 n. 1.
29 id.
30 Id. at 609.
31 Id. at 611-12.
32 Id. at 612 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994)).
33
Id. at 611.
27
28
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Thus, while the posters were creative works, this use focused on their value as
historical artifacts.
The court deemed the third factor-the amount and substantiality of the
portion used-to be a toss-up, since to accomplish its transformative purpose, "DK
displayed reduced versions of the original images and intermingled these visuals
with text and original graphic art. As a consequence, even though the copyrighted
images are copied in their entirety, the visual impact of their artistic expression is
significantly limited because of their reduced size."34
Finally, the important fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the market for
the value of the original, tilted conclusively for the defendant:
DK's use of BGA's images is transformatively different from their
original expressive purpose. In a case such as this, a copyright holder
cannot prevent others from entering fair use markets merely "by
developing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational
or other transformative uses of its own creative work... [C]opyright
owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets ....
The court continued by noting that "a publisher's willingness to pay license fees
for reproduction of images does not establish that the publisher may not, in the
alternative, make fair use of those images. 36
One of the most notable features of this enlightening opinion is the court's
heavy reliance for precedent on some of the last decade's crop of fair use cases
involving claims against documentary filmmakers-many of which were resolved
in favor of the defendants.37 A description of some of those decisions follows.
IV. MOTION PICTURES AND FAIR USE

BY THE

NUMBERS

This important development in fair use began in 1996, with Monster
Communications v. Turner Broadcasting System, 38 which involved no more than
two minutes of clips from When We Were Kings, an acclaimed non-fiction feature
on the Mohammad Ali-George Forman "rumble in the jungle," that had been
incorporated into a TNT made-for-television documentary called "Ali-The
Whole Story., 39 The court marches through the four statutory factors, finding that
its status as a biography of a public figure favors fair use: that "the character [of
the quoted material] as historical film footage may strengthen somewhat the hand
of a fair use defendant as compared with an alleged infringer of a fanciful work or
14

Id. at 613.

Id. at 614-15 (quoting Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d
132, 146 n.l 1 (2d Cir. 1998)).
36 Id. at 615 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
585 n.18
(1994).
37 Id. at 608-15.
38 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
39 Id. at 491.
35
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a work presented in a medium that offers a greater variety of forms of
expression;, 40 that the amount taken is small, both quantitatively and, in light of
the different topical emphases of the two films qualitatively; 4 1 and that neither the
commercial reception of When We Were Kings itself, nor the prospects for spinoffs, such as music videos, from the film, were likely to be affected by the
existence of the television program.4 2 Notably, the court did not address the
powerful but circular argument that copyright owners sometimes make in
connection with the fourth factor: that the very loss of licensing revenue from the
defendant's use represents market harm. It was this argument-apparently not
presented by the plaintiff here-that the court in Bill Graham Archives
subsequently answered by its reference to "transformative markets. 43 Finally, in
addition to being first in the line of documentary fair use cases, Monster also has
the distinction of being one of the last fair use decisions-relating to this or any
other domain of practice-to not mention "transformativeness."
For better or worse, tranformativeness rapidly became a meta-factor,
dominating juridical discourse. And although most documentary filmmakers who
have been defending infringement claims on the basis of fair use have been as
successful as TNT was in Monster, there have been exceptions to this trend-and
they are instructive in their own right. To illustrate, consider two decisions dealing
with biographical documentaries: Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport
Video,44 and Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, Inc.45 In the first of these
cases, defendants, Passport Video, produced a sixteen-hour video documentary
about the life and times of Elvis, which the court described as follows:
The biography itself is indeed exhaustive. The producers interviewed
over 200 people regarding virtually all aspects of Elvis' life. The
documentary is divided into 16 one-hour episodes, each with its own
theme. For example, one episode is entitled "The Army Years," whereas
another-"The Spiritual Soul of Elvis"-chronicles ... religious
themes ....
The Definitive Elvis uses Plaintiffs' copyrighted materials in a
variety of ways. With the video footage, the documentary often uses
shots of Elvis appearing on television while a narrator or interviewee
talks over the film. These clips range from only a few seconds in length
to portions running as long as 30 seconds. In some instances, the clips
are the subject of audio commentary, while in other instances they would
more properly be characterized as video "filler" because the
commentator is discussing a subject different from or more general than
40

Id. at 494.

41Id.

42

at 494-95.

1Id.at 495.
43 Id. at 495-96.
44

349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003).

45 146 F. Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Elvis' performance on a particular television show. But also significant is
the frequency with which the copyrighted video footage is used. The
Definitive Elvis employs these clips, in many instances, repeatedly. In
total, at least 5% to 10% of The Definitive Elvis uses Plaintiffs'
copyrighted materials.
Use of the video footage, however, is not limited to brief clips. In
several instances, the audio commentary discusses Elvis' appearance on
a show and then, without additional voice-over, a clip is played from the
show featuring Elvis. For example, one excerpt from The Steve Allen
show plays continuously for over one minute without interruption. This
excerpt includes the heart of Elvis' famous "Hound Dog" appearance on
The Steve Allen show.
In the aggregate, the excerpts comprise a substantial portion of
Elvis' total appearances on many of these shows. For example, almost all
of Elvis' appearance on The Steve Allen Show is contained in The
Definitive Elvis. Thirty-five percent of his appearances on The Ed
Sullivan Show is replayed, as well as three minutes from The 1968
Comeback Special.
The use of Plaintiffs' copyrighted still photographs and music is
more subtle and difficult to spot. The photographs are used in a way
similar to some of the video footage: the photograph is displayed as
video filler while a commentator discusses a topic. The photographs are
not highlighted or discussed as objects of the commentary like many of
the video pieces are. Finally, the songs are played both as background
music and in excerpts from Elvis' concerts, television appearances, and
movies.46
As may be imagined, the court was not impressed with the defendant's fair use
arguments under the various Section 107 factors. At the outset, in connection with
the first statutory factor, the filmmakers' uses were deemed preponderantly nontransformative.47 The court pointed to some instances of transformative use where
"the clips play for only a few seconds and are used for reference purposes while a
narrator talks over them or interviewees explain their context in Elvis' career;" but
other "clips are played without much interruption, if any," and indicated that "[t]he
purpose of showing these clips likely goes beyond merely making a reference for a
biography, but instead serves the same intrinsic entertainment value that is
protected by Plaintiffs' copyrights. 4 8
With this out of the way, the statutory fair use factors began to pile up against
the defendants: many of the works quoted were creative in nature rather than
merely factual, and too many of the defendant's uses involved unnecessarily long
quotations, repetitions of shorter ones, or quotations that represented the "heart" of
Elvis PresleyEnters., 349 F.3d at 625.
Id. at 628-29.
48 id.
46
47
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the copyrighted work-"Elvis' appearance on the shows, in many cases singing the
most familiar passages of his most popular songs., 49 Finally, and fatally, the
appeals court saw no reason to upset the trial judge's decision that, where the
fourth factor was concerned:
Passport's use is commercial in nature, and thus we can assume market
harm. Second, Passport has expressly advertised that The Definitive Elvis
contains the television appearances for which Plaintiffs normally charge
a licensing fee. If this type of use became wide-spread, it would likely
undermine the market for selling Plaintiffs' copyrighted material. This
conclusion, however, does not apply to the music and still photographs.
It seems unlikely that someone in the market for these materials would
purchase The Definitive Elvis instead of a properly licensed product.
Third, Passport's use of the television appearances was, in some
instances, not transformative, and therefore these uses are likely to affect
the market because they serve the same purpose as Plaintiffs' original
works.5°

Although the details of this market analysis are subject to some doubt, the more
general message of the court of appeals' opinion is clear: once the defendant had
lost the battle over "transformativeness," the factoral analysis lines up neatly in the
plaintiffs' favor.5'

Hofheinz presents a very different picture. In a suit brought by the widow of
one of the principals of American International Pictures, the court ruled that
unauthorized inclusion of copyrighted film clips from It Conquered the World in
an A&E biography about the career of actor Peter Graves was protected fair use
because they were "not shown to recreate the creative expression reposing in
plaintiffs [copyrighted] film, [but] for the transformative purpose of enabling the
viewer to understand the actor's modest beginnings in the film business. 5 2 Once
53
this was established, the other factors weighed, overall, in the defendants' favor.
Id. at 630.
'o Id. at 631.
5 Another recent example of a nonfiction filmmaker who went "over the top" and
49

forfeited the ability to rely on fair use can be found in Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Lloyd E.
Rigler-Lawrence E. Deutsch Found., No. 04 Civ. 5332(NRB), 2005 WL 2875327, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005). In the case, the defendant's Classic Arts Showcase program for
public television consisted of a miscellaneous collection of clips showing famous
performances by musicians, dancers and so forth, intended to whet viewers' interest in the
fine arts. Id. Included among the quoted materials were excerpts from a movie, Carnegie
Hall, that the plaintiff company licenses for TV and home video distribution. Id. Finding
that the inclusion of the clip was "non-transfomative," the court then made relatively short
work of the remaining statutory factors. Id. at *7-8.
52

Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y.

2001).

" Id. at 447-49.
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Where the fourth factor was concerned, the court held that "[t]he proper question is
whether the Graves biography was, in effect, a substitute for Hofheinz's film
clips"-not whether she stood to lose licensing revenue if the fair use defense was
upheld.54 The fact that the filmmakers might have licensed the clip rather than
appropriating it was not, in itself, enough: "Plaintiff may not bootstrap the specter
of a fair use holding against her here, on the facts of this case, as reason why the
use is not a fair use to begin with. 55
The analysis applied in Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks was based, in
large part, on the opinion in another of the Hofheinz trilogy, Hojheinz v. AMC
Productions, Inc.56 The discussion of the film clips from It Conquered the World
found in Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, in turn, prefigured the outcome in
the last of these cases, Hofheinz v. Discovery Communications, Inc.,57 decided late
in 2001, in which a fair use defense was validated in connection with the use of a
clip from Invasion of the Saucermen in a Learning Channel program entitled Aliens
Invade Hollywood.58
The copyright lawyer who experienced a dearth of success in the Hofheinz
cases returned to the fray on behalf of a different client several years later, still on
the trail of unauthorized clips of Hollywood aliens. This time, Good Morning
America used clips from Robot Monster, The Brainfrom PlanetArous, and Plan 9
from Outer Space in segments about the American fascination with
extraterrestrials. The clips illustrated presenter Joel Siegel's theme that "big or
small, cute or icky, alien life as portrayed in pop culture inevitably shares some
humanlike traits. 59 It is hardly a surprise, at this point, that the fact of this
recontextualization was enough to demonstrate the transformativeness of the use.
Further, the court specifically rejected the argument that uses cannot be both
transformative and entertaining.6 ° It quoted the judge in the final Hofheinz case6 '
and went on to cite various heavy-duty authorities for declining to parse this
illusive distinction.6 a
Three lawsuits surrounding the famous footage of the beating of truck driver
Reginald Denny near the intersection of Florence and Normandie during the 1992
Los Angeles riots further illustrate the use of transformativeness in judicial
decisions, although they do not involve documentary film production as such. The
Los Angeles News Service, an independent provider of news footage to TV
54

Id. at 449.

55 Id.
56

147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).

" No. 00 Civ. 3802(HB), 2001 WL 1111970, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001).
58

Id.

'9 Id. at *1-2.

Id. at *9.
"Section 107 does not explicitly distinguish between entertaining and serious,
plausible and implausible, or weighty or frivolous commentaries, and I do not propose to
engage in such subjective line-drawing." Id. (quoting Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc'ns
Inc., No. 00 Civ. 3802(HB), 2001 WL 1111970, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001)).
60
61

62

Id.
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stations and other outlets, brought suit against television stations for the
unauthorized use of their footage. Two of these cases, Los Angeles News Service v.
KCAL-TV, 63 and Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television International,

Ltd.,64 involved unlicensed broadcast of the footage while it still had considerable
"hot news" value.65 At base, the court's skepticism about these defendants' fair use
defenses reflected the fact that the footage in question was being reused to fulfill
the very purpose for which it originally had been captured-to serve news
reporting-rather than in some more "transformative" way.6 6

By contrast, when Los Angeles News Service sued Court TV, some months
later, for using
a few seconds of footage from "Beating of Reginald Denny," primarily
the frames depicting Damien Williams throwing a brick at Denny's head,
in on-air "teaser" spots promoting its coverage of the trial [of the
assailants and] incorporat[ing] the brick-throwing footage into the
introductory montage for its show "Prime Time Justice," which used a
stylized orange clock design superimposed over a grainy, tinted,
monochromatic video background [that] changed as the "hands" of the
clock revolved, [with] LANS's copyrighted video was in the background
for a couple of seconds, one 360 degree sweep of the clock.67
Working its way through the fair use factors, the federal appeals court concluded
that while the quotations in "teasers" were not transformative, the more
"commercially exploitive" incorporation of the footage into the Prime Time Justice
introduction did include "the element of creativity beyond mere publication, and it
serves some purpose beyond newsworthiness. 68 The court went on to note that the
highly factual nature of the footage pointed "clearly" toward fair use, and that the
amount of material used was small, expressing skepticism that brief excerpts could
be considered "the heart of the work., 6 9 Finally, the court found that there was
little chance that Court TV's uses (or others like them) would harm the licensing
market for longer clips-which was, after all, the Los Angeles News Service's
core business. 70 Despite the court's equivocation on the issue of
"transformativeness," what seems to have carried the day was its conviction that
Court TV's uses were somehow out of the ordinary. 7'
The Wade Williams and CBS Broadcastingdecisions serve as perhaps the best

evidence of how far the federal courts have gone to create a generally hospitable
63

108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997).

64 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998).
66

KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d at 1120; Reuters Television, 149 F.3d at 990.
KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d at 1121-22; Reuters Television, 149 F.3d at 993-94.

67

L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2002).

68

Id. at 939.
Id. at 942.

65

69

70
71

Id. at 940-41.
Id. at 942.
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space for nonfiction filmmaking and related media activities through their
application of the fair use doctrine. Even where the quotation of existing copyright
content is done as much to amuse as to enlighten, or for a promotional purpose, the
fact that it has been "transformed" through repurposing weighs heavily in favor of
a fair use finding-at least where the quotation is not overly extensive.
In principle, at least, similar results might be expected where quotations are
used in fiction films. In practice, it is difficult to be so confident. The fair use cases
involving appropriation of preexisting copyrighted elements in narrative films are
fewer-too few, in fact, to form anything resembling a pattern. One decision
sometimes mentioned in this connection, Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp.,
actually avoids the issue of fair use in assessing a copyright challenge to the
motion picture Seven.72 Instead, the court finds that fleeting glimpses of the
plaintiff photographer's images in the background of a scene in which detectives
search a suspect's apartment are too trivial to constitute even potential
infringements.73 The previous year in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,
Inc., another appeals court criticized a trial court's prior finding that an artist's
poster used as set decoration in a television situation comedy constituted fair use.74
The main ground for skepticism was the lack of transformativeness: "Ringgold's
work was used by defendants for precisely the decorative purpose that was a
principal reason why she created it."' 75 In contrast, in Jackson v. Warner Bros., Inc.
several of the plaintiffs appropriately themed paintings decorated a set
representing the apartment of a principal character in the film Made In America,
and the court found fair use.76
These cases are too scattered and too disparate in both outcome and analytic
approach to offer any real guidance, going forward, to narrative filmmakers. And
while the cases involving documentary filmmaking are sufficiently numerous and
consistent to suggest a pattern, a problem remains: although the documentary cases
cover a fairly wide range of different specific filmmaking practices, they by no
means exhaust the list of situations in which a documentary producer might wish
to rely on fair use. They illustrate a mode of analysis, and suggest a considerable
judicial bias in favor of enabling documentarians access to preexisting copyrighted
material. But they leave many questions unanswered-as does any set of legal
precedents applying a principle of general applicability-like negligence in tort or
self-defense in criminal law, to specific circumstances.

72

147 F.3d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1998).

73 Id.

126 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id.at 78 n.8.
76 993 F. Supp. 585, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1997). The outcome appears to have been
influenced, in some degree, by the fact that the plaintiffs objections to the use were
74

75

primarily ideological rather than economic. Id. at 591. Fair use also provides a secondary
rationale for the court's finding of noninfringement in Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1046, 1048 (S.D.N.Y 1994), where plaintiffs "Baby Bears"
hanging mobile was used as set ddcor in the film Immediate Family.
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V. THE CRITIQUE OF FAIR USE
The notoriously fact-specific nature of fair use analysis recently led some of
the foremost advocates of greater openness in the copyright system to raise
questions about the doctrine's utility. Thus, for example, Professor Lawrence
Lessig has argued that fair use doesn't strike an adequate balance in copyright law.
The statutory formulation, he asserts, is too vague and open-ended to be relied
upon effectively; its real utility is severely limited because fair use claims can be
tested only after the fact of use and then only when a creator relying on the
doctrine is able to retain legal counsel and willing to expose himself or herself to
considerable economic risk in the event that the defense fails." Professor David
Lange, in turn, has speculated about the possibility of new legislation that would
supplant fair use and lighten the burden of copyright clearance on documentary
78
filmmakers by providing them with a special compulsory license.
But however reasonable and unthreatening proposals like Professor Lange's
may be, in fact, there is little likelihood that the motion picture and music
industries, which exercise considerable sway in these matters, would tolerate their
enactment. Fair use, as the law summarized above now stands, actually offers
filmmakers and other creators of media considerable latitude for creative practice.
But the critique of fair use as being too vague and unreliable to be of much
practical use has achieved considerable currency, and it operates to discourage
media practitioners, their lawyers, and their so-called "gatekeepers," including
distributors, broadcasters, insurers, and others from relying on the doctrine. What
can be done to address it, and to encourage filmmakers to take advantage of their
fair use rights?
VI. THE STRUCTURAL MEANING OF THE FAIR USE CASES

Fair use challenges filmmakers, as well as other practice communities, to find
ways of making this powerful but elusive doctrine more transparent and
predictable. The key to meeting this challenge can be found in the passage of
Professor Latman's historical study, quoted earlier in this essay: "Justification for a
reasonable use of a copyrighted work is also said to be based on custom. ' 79 In
77 See

generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:

How BIG MEDIA USES
CREATIVITY 116-68
CONTROL
CULTURE
AND
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN

(2004) (describing how copyright law has changed from traditional regulation of
commercial copying to regulation of private copying, creativity, and transformation). These
themes are developed at greater length in Professor Lessig's testimony to the House of
Representatives. Testimony on The Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003: Hearing
on H.R. 107 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 108th

Cong. 15-22 (2004) (statement of Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Stanford Law School).
78 See the webcast of the April 2, 2004 legal panel from the "Full Frame" conference,
available at http://www.law.duke.edu/framed/ (follow link titled "Culture on the Legal
Cutting Room Floor").
79 See LATMAN, supra note 16, at 785.
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other words, courts engaged in fair use decision-making should care about
evidence of what is considered "reasonable" and "customary" within the relevant
practice communities. Before the enactment of Section 107, case law offered
various examples of this approach. 80 These cases included several instances in
which customary practice was explicitly considered. 8'
Fair use discourse shifted after the enactment of Section 107, and for a time
the customary roots of the doctrine were obscured. Scholars sought coherence
elsewhere, particularly in utilitarian economic analysis. Other commentators
expressed pessimism whether fair use analysis, which depends on a "calculus of
incommensurables," could ever be rationalized or made more predictable.83
Although the Supreme Court, in 1985, acknowledged the connection between
custom and fair use,84 many lower courts temporarily lost sight of this dimension
of the doctrine, turning their attention instead to the factoral analysis apparently
privileged by the statute. 85 And, as we have seen, their opinions came to focus
increasingly on the issue of "transformativeness."
As Michael Madison has convincingly demonstrated, however, the link
between fair use and custom never really was severed--only temporarily
overlooked:
I suggest.., that the contemporary focus on "case-by-case adjudication
of fair use disputes misunderstands the properly contextual orientation of
fair use decision making as it developed historically, as Congress
understood it when it enacted the fair use statute, and as the statute
actually has been applied over the last twenty-five years.86
80

See generally Harry Rosenfeld, Customary Use as "FairUse" in Copyright Law,

25 BuFF. L. REv. 119 (1975) (stating that where applicable, custom is per se "Fair Use").
81 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966) (unauthorized biography of Howard Hughes). In 1973, the United States Court of
Claims held that handwritten copies of text materials by scholars represented fair use since
they were "customary facts of copyright-life." Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,
487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973). This mode of analysis is also employed after 1978, as
demonstrated by Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986)
(reaffirming that it is "both reasonable and customary for biographers to refer to and utilize
earlier works" (quoting Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307)).
Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structuraland Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1631 (1982); William
W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1698-1700
82

(1988).

83
84

(1985).

Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1999).
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550-51 & n.4

That this trend may have run its course is suggested by the discussion of custom in
a 2006 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff's
Department, 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 2006).
86 Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-OrientedApproach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1525, 1587 (2004).
85

2007]

FAIR USE AND MOTION PICTURES

Professor Madison argues that as courts explore the four factors and ponder
degrees and kinds of "transformativeness," they are in fact seeking to ascertain
whether the challenged work fits within a privileged use category, or on the other
hand, whether an invocation of fair use is merely an infringer's attempt to dress its
unjustifiable appropriations in borrowed plumage.8 7 Thus, Madison points out, the
very first fair use decision, Folsom v. Marsh of 1841, involved a judicial effort to
88
distinguish between true biographical scholarship and simple free-riding.
Likewise, the focus of the Supreme Court's celebrated 1994 "2 Live Crew"
decision was whether the allegedly infringed song was a genuine parody or a mere
effort to capitalize on the fame of the plaintiffs song. 89 By the same token, in
many of the cases involving nonfiction filmmakers reviewed above, the underlying
issue was whether the challenged production was actually a documentary, or
merely an entertainment film in disguise. And in the handful of cases involving
narrative filmmaking, a recurrent question is whether the reproductions of
defendants' artistic creations were actually part of the film's decorative
background-or something more. Such inquiries, although currently conducted
using the vocabulary of Section 107, always involve-at bottom-a comparison
between the practices of a defendant and the norm or pattern of use with which he
seeks to affiliate. And the best way to determine whether, in Madison's terms, a
genuine "patterned" use is involved is to look, in one way or another, to common
or customary practice in whatever the field of practice may be.90
In a recent article, James Gibson has extended this analysis, warning of a
possible vicious circle in fair use jurisprudence. 9' Documenting the extent to which
custom and practice are, and long have been, touchstones for fair use analysis, he
goes on to make a further point: when users are excessively conservative in their
practices, choosing to license rights even when they do not have a legal obligation
to do so, the result of this timidity may eventually be a recalibration of the law
itself towards a less permissive setting. 92 He points out that such failures to assert
fair use are often the result of constraints imposed on users by various
"gatekeepers"-including broadcasters, distributors and especially insurers.93 In
effect, Gibson reminds us that the watchword for fair use is "use it or lose it," as he
87
88

Id. at 1586-88.
Id.at 1557.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994).
90 See Madison, supra note 86, at 1631.
91James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
89

116 YALE L.J. 882, 896 (2007).
92 Id. at 896-906. Gibson assembles powerful support for the proposition that
customary usage matters in fair use determinations, although his claim that customs with
respect to licensing practice have long been singled out for special attention is less well
documented. See, e.g., RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925)

(discussing possible market substitution effects without mention of licensing as such);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y.

1934) (discussing same, with additional analysis of custom in general).
93 Gibson, supra note 91, at 896-906.
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points to a problem of negative reinforcement that has been aggravated greatly,
and deliberately, by the practices of large copyright holders.94
What then, can we make of these central perceptions into the real inner
workings of fair use jurisprudence? The answer, I would suggest, is that collective
action offers members of various practice communities a chance to affect the way
in which the law, as applied to them, is understood. 95 The effectiveness of the
approach was tested more than a decade ago by the Society for Cinema and Media
Studies (SCMS). In 1993, with the help of several experts including myself, the
SCMS developed a best-practices code for its members concerning use of stills and
frame grabs from films in academic literature.96 Ever since, this code has
effectively reduced costs and facilitated publication for many film scholars.
Recently, the model has been extended to the field of documentary filmmaking
practice.

VII. STATEMENTS OF BEST PRACTICES-PROCESSES AND PRODUCTS
97
The Documentary Filmmakers' Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use
("Statement") is a testament to the power of collective self-help and accessible
scholarship. Documentary filmmakers, acting through their organizations and with
coordination and support from academics at American University, have asserted
common principles for the application of fair use under copyright. In so doing,
they have made fair use-the right to quote copyrighted material without
permission or payment, under certain circumstances-far more widely available.
This has made films that formerly would have been treated as too risky for
broadcast-such as controversial works of social or media criticism or certain
historical documentaries-available to viewers today. The filmmakers' example is
one that many other creators' organizations can profit from and emulate.
Documentary filmmakers had found themselves increasingly hemmed in by
ever more owner-friendly copyright law, especially as the term of copyrights was
repeatedly extended. At this point, the bulk of surviving films and other works
made after 1923 are copyrighted, along with practically all expression created
since 1978, including poems and grocery lists; therefore copyright protection is the
default setting. A 2004 study of current documentary filmmaking practice in

Id. at 895.
Gibson suggests that self-help may be futile because doctrinal feedback "takes
place regardless of... whether copyright users want to do something about it .... .Id. at
906. But if "doing something" includes changing the conduct that gives rise to feedback, it
is not clear why this need be so. The actual experience of documentary filmmakers, as
described below, appears to indicate otherwise.
96 See Kristin Thompson, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Society For Cinema
94

95

Studies,
'FairUsage Publicationof Film Stills,' 32 CINEMA J. 3 (1993).
97

ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT VIDEO AND FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY

FILMMAKERS'

STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES

IN FAIR USE

(2005), available at

http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/publications/statement-of-best-practicesin fairuse/. Excerpts from the Statement appear as an Appendix to this Article.
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copyright clearance, Untold Stories, conducted by Professor Patricia Aufderheide
of the School of Communication at American University, along with the present
author, documented the creative costs of the "clearance culture. 98 For instance,
documentary filmmakers changed the reality they filmed during shooting by
instructing subjects to turn off the television so as to avoid incidental capture of
copyrighted media. They also changed their films in post-production by editing
sounds and images to avoid perceived copyright clearance problems. Further, they
suffered both financial uncertainty and high prices. Worst of all, they avoided
topics that might involve overly complex clearance problems, including social
criticism, musical documentaries, and a wide range subjects involving historical
footage. "I tell people not to make historical films," said Robert Stone. 99
Of the many possible solutions to the crisis in copyright clearance,
filmmakers themselves could address fair use. As noted above, courts respect the
views of practice communities about what constitutes reasonable and appropriate
use of copyrighted materials.' ° But filmmakers interviewed for Untold Stories
found themselves unable to say what was appropriate because they did not know
what the consensus of their peers was on how to fairly and reasonably interpret the
law.' O' To help filmmakers to establish such a consensus, Aufderheide and I
worked with five filmmaker organizations: Association of Independent Video and
Filmmakers, Independent Feature Project, International Documentary Association,
National Alliance for Media Arts and Culture, and Women in Film and Video,
Washington, D.C. Chapter. 0 2 In thirteen meetings, including ten small group
meetings hosted by the various professional organizations, the scholars worked
with veteran professional filmmakers to articulate principles, and limitations on
those principles, for the application of fair use.' 0 3 In these conversations,
documentarians wrestled to define both what their own needs were to quote others'
material without permission or payment, and what they thought would
°4 be
acceptable, were someone to quote their own material without authorization.'
The Statement °5 deals with four recurrent situations in documentary
filmmaking practice: quotation of copyrighted material for purposes of critique;
quotations of popular culture to illustrate an argument; incidental capture of media

98 PATRICIA

AUFDERHEIDE

&

PETER

JASZI,

UNTOLD

STORIES:

CREATIVE

CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS

(2004), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_
Report.pdf.
99 Id. Robert Stone is a documentary filmmaker whose titles include the film
American Bablyon, as well as American Experience episodes "Radio Bikini," "Satellite
Sky," and "Guerrilla: The Taking of Patty Hearst."
1OO
See Rosenfeld, supra note 80, at 133-37.
1OAUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 98, at 22-25.
102ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT VIDEO AND FILMMAKERS, supra note 97, at 1.

'03 Id. at 3-6.
104id.

1o5Id. 3-4.
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content in documenting the lives of a film's subjects; 10 6 and the use of copyrighted
material in historical narrative.'0 7 The treatment of the latter topic emerged out of a
rich and difficult discussion among the documentarians; not only did the
filmmakers respect the importance of archival activities-and understand the
importance of compensating them-but they were quick to see that today's
documentaries are tomorrow's archival footage.' °8 At the same time, they were
outraged by, for example, CSPAN's refusal to release some presidential and
Congressional material, and the arbitrary licensing practices of some private
archives.' 9 The Statement carefully balances these various concerns. It declares
that filmmakers in general should clear historical archive material, unless it is
impossible or the terms are extortionate.' 10 If it is still imperative to use the
material-which is not the primary subject of the documentary-then the
filmmaker must use only as much as is needed to make the point, and should credit
the source.11
The balanced nature of the Statement, as the product of a community with
stakes both in maintaining copyright and allowing for reasonable levels of access
to protected material, has made the document powerfully persuasive. Following its
release on November 18, 2005, the Statement had an immediate effect. It was used
by three filmmakers to justify inclusion of their films at the Sundance Film
Festival only eight weeks later, including Kirby Dick (This Film Is Not Yet Rated),
Ricki Stem and Annie Sundberg (The Trials of Darryl Hunt), and Byron Hurt
(Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats & Rhymes).

12

In The Trials of Darryl Hunt, for example,

the filmmakers had followed, and helped to organize, protests in a racially-charged
death penalty case, and then chronicled the eventual proof that the accused was

Id. at 3-5. This is an issue that was of great concern to documentary filmmakers
working in the cinema veritj mode. The conclusion arrived at by the filmmakers in the
Statement appears to be entirely consistent with the first principles of fair use articulated by
the courts and Congress. Although Professor Gibson suggests that the case law on the
question is divided, see Gibson, supra note 91, at 890 n.16, 906 n.89, the reality is that it
has simply gone unaddressed, with the singular exception of Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
106

P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (dictum on incidental capture

by still photographer as fair use). The other cases cited by Gibson involve the purposeful,
chosen use of copyrighted material in the backgrounds of fiction film sequences, not the
incidental capture of existing media content by documentarians.
107 Of course, as the Statement itself makes clear, the articulation of these consensus
principles is not intended to foreclose the assertion of fair use by filmmakers in other
situations. ASSOCIATION
108 Id. at 3-4.

OF INDEPENDENT VIDEO AND FILMAKERS, supra note

97, at 3-4.

109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, SUCCESS OF THE STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES 1

(2005), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/success

of-the-statement.pdf.
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innocent. 3 Archival footage had been used with the permission of the local
broadcast station, but when news station leadership saw the potential of making
their own documentary, this permission suddenly was withdrawn." 4 The
filmmakers stood
on the ground of fair use to use archival broadcast news footage
5
in their film.''
Within four weeks of the Statement's release, Aufderheide and I hosted a
meeting with broadcast and cable executives. This meeting precipitated a decision
by the Independent Feature Channel (IFC) to create an internal fair use policy
allowing it to clear the cablecast of This Film Is Not Yet Rated, which includes
more than one hundred uncleared quotes from popular recent films as part of a
critique of the MPAA rating system. IFC also saved hundreds of thousands of
dollars by relying on fair use to reduce clearance claims for a documentary about
road movies, Wanderlust.16 By April 2006, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)
accepted the applicability of fair use to Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats & Rhymes, which

quotes substantial amounts of music and video in its argument that hip-hop had
become a celebration of misogyny and violence." 7 Moreover, PBS shared
the
8
Statement with all general managers and general counsels in its network."
Perhaps the most powerful evidence of the transformation that the Statement
has helped to work is that four of the seven insurers who offer errors and omissions
insurance to filmmakers are now offering to cover fair use claims, and others may
soon follow. 19 It took insurers, cautious by nature, some eighteen months to
reconsider their practice in the light of a consensus document that dramatically
lowered risk. 20 At least where documentary filmmaking is concerned, the vicious
circle of which Professor Gibson warns' 21 may have been replaced by a "virtuous
circle."
Film professors also have become activists for the expanded freedom of
expression that the Statement permitted. The University Film and Video
Association sponsored an award for the best use of fair use in a student and/or

Patricia Aufderheide, How Documentary Filmmakers Overcame Their Fear of
Quoting and Learned to Employ Fair Use: a Tale of Scholarship in Action, 1 INT'L J. OF
COMM.114 26, 33-34 (2007), availableat http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/10/26.
113

id.

115 See id.
116

See Elaine Dutka, Legendary Film Clips: No Free Samples?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,

2006, § 2, at 16.
1" See CENTER FOR SOCIAL

MEDIA, supra note 112, at 1; HIP-HOP:Beyond Beats &
Rhymes (PBS Independent Lens premier Feb. 20, 2007).
1i8 CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 112, at 1.
119 Id. See also the postings for February 13, 2007 ("Insurer accepts fair use claims!")
and February 24, 2007 ("MediaPro also uses Fair Use Best Practices Statement for
insurance policies"), on the "Beyond Broadcast Blog," http://www.centerforsocialmedia
.org/ blogs/future-of-public-media/.
20
CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 112, at 1.
121 See Gibson, supra note 91, at 896.
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professor's work. 22 In addition, teachers began using the Center for Social
Tools, including a DVD that provides core teaching
Media's Fair Use Teaching
23
use.'
fair
on
materials
Other creator groups also began to organize to emulate the best-practices
model. Music educators, media literacy practitioners, and art historians began the
process of assessing problems in their communities and establishing peer groups
among professionals to deliberate common values. 124 In her 2006 book,
Permissions, A Survival Guide: Blunt Talk About Art as Intellectual Property,
Bielstein warmly endorses the potential of the best
veteran publisher Susan
25
practices approach. 1
The Documentary Filmmakers' Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use has
begun to change practices and expand possibilities in many areas of media-making
and scholarship. 126 It is part of a contemporary movement to reclaim the copyright
system for the public-its original intended beneficiary. Responsibility for
realizing the potential of the approach exemplified by the Statement now lies with
teachers, students and practitioners themselves.

See Center for Social Media Newsletter, News from the Fair Use Project (Feb. 2,
2006), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/newsletter/entry/february-events-andnew/#.
122
123

See http://centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/fair

use-teachingjtools/.

124 See, e.g., RENEE HOBBS, PETER JASZI & PAT AUFDERHEIDE, CENTER FOR SOCIAL

THE COSTS OF COPYRIGHT CONFUSION FOR MEDIA LITERACY 21-22 (2007),
at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/Final-CSM-copyright-report.pdf.
available
125 See SUSAN M. BIELSTEIN, PERMISSIONS, A SURVIVAL GUIDE: BLUNT TALK ABOUT
ART AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4-5 (2006).
MEDIA,

126

For a further discussion of the Statement and its background, see Paige Gold, Fair

Use and the First Amendment: Corporate Control of Copyright is Stifling Documentary
Making and Thwarting the Aims of the FirstAmendment (bepress Legal Series, Working
Paper No. 950, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=

4599&context=expresso.
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from the Documentary Filmmakers' Statement of Best Practices
[An excerpt
127
on FairUse]
This statement recognizes that documentary filmmakers must choose whether
or not to rely on fair use when their projects involve the use of copyrighted
material. It is organized around four classes of situations that they confront
regularly in practice. (These four classes do not exhaust all the likely situations
where fair use might apply; they reflect the most common kinds of situations that
documentarians identified at this point.) In each case, a general principle about the
applicability of fair use is asserted, followed by qualifications that may affect
Individual cases.
ONE: EMPLOYING COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL AS THE OBJECT OF SOCIAL,
POLITICAL OR CULTURAL CRITIQUE

Description: This class of uses involves situations in which documentarians
engage in media critique, whether of text, image or sound works. In these cases,
documentarians hold the specific copyrighted work up for critical analysis.
Principle: Such uses are generally permissible as an exercise of
documentarians' fair use rights. This is analogous to the way that (for example) a
newspaper might review a new book and quote from it by way of illustration.
Indeed, this activity is at the very core of the fair use doctrine as a safeguard for
freedom of expression. So long as the filmmaker analyzes or comments on the
work itself, the means may vary. Both direct commentary and parody, for example,
function as forms of critique. Where copyrighted material is used for a critical
purpose, the fact that the critique itself may do economic damage to the market for
the quoted work (as a negative book review could) is irrelevant. In order to qualify
as fair use, the use may be as extensive as is necessary to make the point,
permitting the viewer to fully grasp the criticism or analysis.
Limitations: There is one general qualification to the principle just stated.
The use should not be so extensive or pervasive that it ceases to function as
critique and become, instead, a way of satisfying the audience's taste for the thing
(or the kind of thing) critiqued. In other words, the critical use should not become a
market substitute for the work (or other works like it).
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Two: QUOTING COPYRIGHTED WORKS OF POPULAR CULTURE TO ILLUSTRATE AN
ARGUMENT OR POINT

Description: Here the concern with material (again of whatever kind) that is
quoted not because it is, in itself, the object of critique, but because it aptly
illustrates some argument or point that a filmmaker is developing-as clips from
fiction films might be used (for example) to demonstrate changing American
attitudes toward race.
Principle: Once again, this sort of quotation should generally be considered
as fair use. The possibility that the quotes might entertain and engage an audience
as well as to illustrate a filmmaker's argument takes nothing away from the fair use
claim. Works of popular culture typically have illustrative power, and in analogous
situations, writers in print media do not hesitate to use illustrative quotations (both
words and images). In documentary filmmaking, such a privileged use will be both
subordinate to the larger intellectual or artistic purpose of the documentary and
important to its realization. The filmmaker is not presenting the quoted material for
its original purpose but harnessing it for a new one. This is an attempt to add
significant new value, not a form of "free riding"-the mere exploitation of
existing value.
Limitations: Documentarians will be best positioned to assert fair use claims
if they assure that:
"
*
"

"

the material is properly attributed, either through an accompanying
on-screen identification or a mention in the film's final credits;
from
to the extent possible and appropriate, quotations are drawn
a range of different sources;
each quotation (however many may be employed to create an
overall pattern of illustrations) is no longer than is necessary to
achieve the intended effect;
the quoted material is not employed merely in order to avoid or
inconvenience of shooting equivalent footage.

THREE:

CAPTURING COPYRIGHTED MEDIA CONTENT IN THE PROCESS OF
FILMING SOMETHING ELSE

Description: Documentarians often record copyrighted sounds and images
when they are filming sequences in real-life settings. Common examples are the
text of a poster on a wall, music playing on a radio, and television programming
heard (perhaps seen) in the background. In the context of the documentary, the
incidentally captured material is an integral part of the ordinary reality being
documented. Only by altering and thus falsifying the reality they film-such as
telling subjects to turn off the radio, take down a poster, or turn off the TV-could
documentarians avoid this.
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Principle: Fair use should protect documentary filmmakers from being forced
to falsify reality. Where a sound or image has been captured incidentally and
without prevision, as part of an unstaged scene, it should be permissible to use it,
to a reasonable extent, as part of the final version of the film. Any other rule would
be inconsistent with the documentary practice itself and with the values of the
disciplines (such as criticism, historical analysis, and journalism) than inform
reality-based filmmaking.
Limitations: Consistent with the rationale for treating such captured media
uses as fair ones, documentarians should take care that:
"
"
"
"
"

particular media content played or displayed in a scene being filmed
was not requested or directed;
incidentally captured media content included in the final version of
the film is integral to the scene/action;
the content is properly attributed;
the scene has not been included primarily to exploit the incidentally
captured content in its own right, and the captured content does not
constitute the scene's primary focus of interest;
in the case of music, the content does not function as a substitute for
a synch track (as it might, for example, if the sequence containing
the captured music were cut on its beat, or if the music were used
after the filmmaker has cut away to another sequence).

FOUR:

USING COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL IN A HISTORICAL SEQUENCE

Description: In many cases the best (or even the only) effective way to tell a
particular historical story or make a historical point is to make selective use of
words that were spoken during the events in question, music that was associated
with the events, or photographs and films that were taken at that time. In many
cases, such material is available, on reasonable terms, under license. On occasion,
however, the licensing system breaks down.
Principle: Given the social and educational importance of the documentary
medium, fair use should apply in some instances of this kind. To conclude
otherwise would be to deny the potential of filmmaking to represent history to new
generations of citizens. Properly conditioned, this variety of fair use is critical to
fulfilling cultural mission of copyright. But unless limited, the principle also can
defeat the legitimate interests of copyright owners-including documentary
filmmakers themselves.
Limitations: To support a claim that a use of this kind is fair, the
documentarian should be able to show that:
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the film project was not specifically designed around the material in
question;
the material serves a critical illustrative function, and no suitable
substitute exists (that is, a substitute with the same general
characteristics);
the material cannot be licensed, or the material can be licensed only
on terms that are excessive relative to a reasonable budget for the
film in question;
the use is no more extensive than is necessary to make the point for
which the material has been selected;
the film project does not rely predominantly or disproportionately
on any single source for illustrative clips;
the copyright owner of the material used is properly identified.
FAIR USE IN OTHER SITUATIONS FACED BY DOCUMENTARIANS

The four principles just stated do not exhaust the scope of fair use for
documentary filmmakers. Inevitably, actual filmmaking practice will give rise to
situations that are hybrids of those described above or that simply have not been
anticipated. In considering such situations, however, filmmakers should be guided
by the same basic values of fairness, proportionality, and reasonableness that
inform this statement. Where they are confident that a contemplated quotation of
copyrighted material falls within fair use, they should claim fair use.

